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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY ~1. STROUD, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, and 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, a municipal corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 7 687 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts as set forth in the brief of 
Appellant, I feel that it will be beneficial to the review 
of this matter to set forth in addition thereto the follow-
ing facts which I feel are important to Respondent's 
position: 
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There is no dispute that THO~fAS WILLIAM 
STROUD was in the employ of SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION as a police officer up to and prior to 
January 5, 1951 (R. 6). Officer JAMES C. McGARRY 
had eight (8) cases of soda water in his car, and he and 
STROUD were transferring them from the McGARRY 
car to the STROUD car. That McGARRY did not see the 
gun discharge or know how it happened-(R. 11), nor 
did MeG ARRY or anyone else hear or see the gun fall, 
if in fact it did fall (R. 11), nor did McGARRY or any-
one else see the gun or any gun on the person of 
STROUD before he heard a shot (R. 11). 
The gun McGARRY saw on the sidewalk was not 
issued by the SALT LAKE CITY Police Department 
(R. 12-27). The car STROUD was using was his own 
personal car ( R. 12), and the soda water was to be taken 
to a Ward House to be used at a square dance the night 
of January 5, 1951, which dance was purely a social 
function to be attended by police officers and their wives 
(R. 12) and had nothing to do with the Police Depart-
ment as such, and was not a required function (R. 13). 
At the time of the shot, STROUD was dressed in civilian 
clothes (R. 13) and it was his day off (R. 13, 14, 19, 32, 
33). The car to be checked out by STROUD was checked 
out by Acting Sergeant BRINTON (R. 19, 36). Police 
officers, while off duty, are not required to carry guns, 
either by order of the Chief or by the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Police Department or the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Civil Service Commission (R. 21, 24, 26), 
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and an officer would not be reprilnanded if he did not 
carry a gun while off duty (R. 26). ELl\1:ER E. BRIN-
TOX was ~-\rting Sergeant of the shift on January 5, 
1951 (R. 3~). Only the ~-\rting Sergeant's orders would be 
carried out (R. 36). 
It was agreed by counsel for Appellant, SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION, and the INDUSTRIAL 
CO~LJIISSIOX (R. 6) that the only issue involved in this 
matter is whether the accident which caused the death 
of THOMAS WILLIAl\f STROUD arose out of or in 
the course of his employment while employed by SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION as is· provided by Sec-
tion 42-1-43, U.C.A., 1943. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
COURT'S POWER IS LIMITED IN REVIEWING DE-
CISIONS OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
II. 
THE DEATH OF STROUD DID NOT ARISE OUT OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION. 
III. 
ACCIDENTS THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT OF OR DUR-
ING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT COMPEN-
SABLE EVEN THOUGH EMPLOYEE IS SUBJECT TO CALL 
24 HOURS A DAY. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
IV. 
NECESSARY TO BE COMPLYING WITH AN ORDER 
OR RULE OF EMPLOYER. 
v. 
STROUD WAS NOT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
COURT'S POWER IS LIMITED IN REVIEWING DE-
CISIONS OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, on occasions too 
numerous to mention, held that in a proceeding to review 
a decision of the Industrial Commission under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, the Court will examine into the 
evidence only to determine whether there is any sub-
stantial competent evidence to support the finding of 
the Commission, and, if there is in fact such evidence, 
the findings will be sustained even though the Commis-
sion could have found either way on the issue. 
We shall cite a few of the authorities to illustrate 
the proposition stated under Point I. 
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Com· 
mission of Utah, 193 P. 642; 
Twin Peaks Canning Company v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 196 P. 854; 
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R1tkazciua l'. ludw·;frial Commission of Utah, 
2-!S P. 1103: 
Banks v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 278 
P. 58. 
POINT II. 
THE DEATH OF STROUD DID NOT ARISE OUT OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION. 
The findings of the Industrial Commission in this 
decision are all sustained by competent substantial evi-
dence given at the ti1ne of the hearing and which, for the 
purpose of this particular argument, are as follows: 
That :JicG~-\.RRY and STROUD had accepted the 
responsibility of furnishing refreshments for a square 
dance to be attended by police officers and their wives, 
which was a purely social function and had nothing to do 
with the Police Department, nor was it a required police 
activity. STROUD was using his personal car to trans-
port the soda water to the Ward House where such dance 
was to be held. MeG ARRY did not, at any time, see the 
gun involved on STROUD'S person on January 5, 1951. 
He heard a shot and turned to see a gun on the pave-
ment. No-one saw the shot fired and there is no testi-
mony that a bullet from this gun caused the death of 
STROUD. January 5, 1951, was STROUD'S day off. 
He came to the station to meet MeG ARRY and transfer 
soda water to his car. Other persons could check out 
cars, and in this case Acting Sergeant BRINTON did 
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check out the car referred to. All officers do not carry 
guns on days off, and no Rule or Regulation of the Police 
Department or Civil Service Commission or order of 
the Department required the carrying of a gun on one's 
day off or while not on duty as a police officer. 
Appellant cites many cases, a number of which are 
not in point here or which are distinguishable, particu-
larly those cases which involved an accident resulting 
in injuries to an employee while going to or from work. 
Utah follows the majority rule that where an employee 
is injured going to and from work at the special direction 
or request of the employer, he is entitled to compensa-
tion. In this case STROUD was not going to or from 
work at the request of the Police Department, nor was 
he engaged in any endeavor which promoted the interest 
of his employer. To the contrary, he was off duty and on 
a mission of his own. 
The case closest in point cited by Appellant is the 
case of Beaver City v. Industrial Commissiort of Utah, 
67 Utah~' 245 P. 378. The facts of this case are entirely 
different and distinguishable from this case. In the 
Beaver City case, supra, the Court found: 
"The accident occurred between the regular 
hours of the marshal* * *"- p. 379. 
and he had gone home to clean his gun as he had no 
office or other convenient place to clean the gun, and the 
Court stated: 
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.. IIad the n1arshal undertaken to clean the 
gun at the ditch and at the time it dropped out of 
his pocket, and in doing so then was injured by 
an accidental discharge of the gun, we think it 
could not sueeessfully be contended that the in-
jury did not arise out of or in the course of his 
en1ploYJnent. And we think it would have made 
no difference had he gone to the city hall (if 
Beaver City had a hall) or to some other con-
venient place, and had there attempted to clean 
the gun. Having no Inaterial with him with which 
to clean the gun, and there being no convenient 
place to clean it, he went to his house. He still 
was on duty and within the corporate limits over 
which his duties extended, and, though in his own 
house, yet in a sense on the premises of his em-
ployer, and, so far as made to appear, there ex-
posed to no more danger in cleaning the gun than 
had he undertaken to clean it at the ditch or at 
some other place. We thus do not see wherein, 
in cleaning the gun at his house, the officer was 
any less in the course of his employment than if 
he had undertaken to clean it at some other place. 
It further is made to appear that cleaning the 
gun at his house was not a place chosen or se-
lected by him as a mere personal convenience or 
accommodation, but rather one of necessity; there 
being no other place where he conveniently could 
have cleaned it. Thus, under the circumstances, 
we think the award was proper." 
In the case of Mayor v. Ward, 114 S.W. 2d, 804, 
cited by Appellant, the Court found that the injured 
policeman was, at the time of the accident, still under 
all of the obligations of his employment, in his uniform, 
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and carrying his badge and weapons of office. He also 
followed up, further, and arrested the drunk driver that 
hit him on the same night it happened. 
All of the other cases cited by Appellant are third 
party cases or cases in which the injured were actually 
in the course of their employment while on duty when 
the injury occurred and are certainly not in point here. 
Could it be argued that a policeman would be en-
titled to compensation from an injury received from a 
gun accident while he was employed as a special officer 
by a department store on his day off, or during non-
working hours; or, during a hike in the mountains with 
his friends or family on his day off or during non-work-
ing hours; or, if he was injured by his gun falling from 
his dresser to the floor while he was either dressing or 
un-dressing while at home on his day off or during non-
working hours~ I do not believe that counsel for Appel-
lant would argue that Appellant would be entitled to any 
relief under the above mentioned instances. 
It must be remembered that STROUD was not called 
back to work. He was on a mission of his own, which 
in no way would benefit his employer. He was under 
no order, Rule or Regulation to carry a gun on off-duty 
hours. There is absolutely no evidence to show any 
causal connection between the injury and his employ-
ment or that the same arose out of his employment. The 
gun was not seen on his person prior to the shooting, and 
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no-one saw the shot fired, and there is no testimony to 
show that a bullet from the gun found on the pavement 
on the sidewalk caused the injury. 
~Iany persons carry firearms, and the carrying of 
firearms has neYer been considered inherently danger-
ous. Accidents from firearms result in most every case 
from the carelessness on the part of the handler. In the 
case of Roberts v. City of Colfax, 260 N.W. 57, the Night 
:Jiarshal of the City, while engaged in cleaning up the 
floor of the city jail, was injured when a revolver which 
he was carr:~ing fell from his pocket and was discharged, 
and the Court held: 
"that the loss of eye caused by discharge of night 
marshal's revolver which fell from his pocket 
while marshal was cleaning floor of jail was not 
compensable as the carrying of firearms by peace 
officers was not a peril or hazard peculiar to the 
work of their office." 
In the case of Kresl v. Village of Dodge, 238 N.W. 
752, the wife of the village marshal heard a shot from 
the bedroom where her husband was changing clothes 
prior to going on duty as the village marshal at about 
6:00 o'clock in the evening. On going to the room, she 
found her husband dead and his revolver lying on the 
floor. The revolver had a bad history, it having gone 
off accidentally on prior occasions. The Court held that 
this was not an accident arising out of employment and 
denied compensation. 
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In the case of Albers v. Kipp, 263 N.W. 593, the 
Court held that an injury to an employee does not "arise 
out of the employment" within Workmen's Compensation 
Law where, without employer's knowledge or direction, 
employee is voluntarily performing work not contem-
plated by employment contract, in a place where his 
duties do not require his presence, and with appliance 
not furnished by employer and used without employer's 
knowledge or consent, notwithstanding work may have 
been beneficial to employer. 
In the case of Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil 
Company, 6 So. 2d 747, the rule is established for the 
common accident test as to whether an accident arose 
out of the employment, the Court stating: 
"That it is only necessary to consider two 
points: (1) Was the employee then engaged about 
his employer's business and not merely pursuing 
his own business or pleasure, and ( 2) Did the 
necessities of the employer's business reasonably 
require that the employee be at the place of the 
accident at the time the accident occurred." 
In the case of Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 158 P. 2d 511, the Court, in deciding the 
question of whether the accident arose out of employ-
ment, laid down the rule that an employer is not an in-
surer and that if the accident occurs while the employee 
is engaged in some act having no relation to his duties 
for his own comfort or otherwise, or has abandoned his 
occupation even temporarily, then injury does not arise 
out of employment. 
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In the case of Roberts and Oake v. Industrial Com-
mission, et al, 39 N.E. ~d 315, the Court held: 
"That in order for a risk to be incidental to 
the en1ployment within Compensation Act it must 
have a relation to the work performed by the 
employee in fulfilling his contract of service, and 
that where an employee assumes to undertake a 
dangerous act which is altogether outside of his 
scope of employment, the risk taken is not inci-
dental to the employment." 
POINT III. 
ACCIDENTS THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT OF OR DUR-
ING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT COMPEN-
SABLE EVEN THOUGH EMPLOYEE IS SUBJECT TO CALL 
24 HOURS A DAY. 
Appellant contends most strongly that because 
STROUD was subject to call 24 hours a day, he was 
entitled to compensation for his injury. Many cases have 
been decided on this point, all of which hold that unless 
the employee was actually in the course of his employ-
ment or that the accident arose out of his employment, 
the same is not compensable. In the case of Sullivan v. 
Industrial Commission, 10 P. 2d 924, a Utah case where 
:Mr. Sullivan was subject to call 24 hours a day, stopped 
over enroute to New York to visit his daughter at Vassar 
College, and while there with his daughter, was injured, 
the Court held: 
"Though an employee is by the terms of his 
employment required to be ready to perform his 
duties for the employer at any hour of the day 
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or night, it does not follow that every accident or 
injury that he may receive during the course of 
the 24 hours arises out of his employment. To be 
compensable, it must appear that at the time of 
the injury he was discharging some of the duties 
he is employed to perform or that what he is doing 
is in some way connected with or incidental to 
the duty owing to the master." 
In the case of Mitchell v. Ball Bros. Co., 186 N.E. 
900, the Court held that the death of an employee struck 
by an automobile while on way to employer's premises 
from lunch without any special call, did not arise out 
of and in the course of employment, although employee 
was subject to call at any time during the day. 
Also, see State Young Men's Christian Association 
v. Industrial Commission, 292 N.W. 324. 
POINT IV. 
NECESSARY TO BE COMPLYING WITH AN ORDER 
OR RULE OF EMPLOYER. 
In reply to the cases cited by Appellant to sustain 
his contention that it is immaterial that employer did 
not order STROUD to carry a gun, I call the Coru:Fs 
attention to the fact that in every case so cited and that 
in all the cases I was able to find where compensation 
was allowed, the injury resulted during the working 
hours of the injured employee's employment and further 
resulted in the actual course of employment. 
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POINT V. 
STROUD WAS NOT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT. 
Stroud was off duty, and was transferring cases 
of soda water from one car to his car when injured. In 
the case of Vitagraph, Inc., v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 85 P. 2d 601, the question arose as to whether the 
accident arose out of or in the course of employment, 
and the Court therein established the rule that for an 
injury to be compensable, the workman must at the time of 
the injury have been engaged in doing some work for the 
employer or under the direction and control of the em-
ployer, or at the point of danger pursuant to or in carry-
ing out the order or direction of the employer, or in 
doing some act necessary to be done for the employment 
or incidental thereto and not detachable therefrom. 
In the case of State Young Men's Christian Asso-
ciation v. Industrial Commission, supra, 292 N.W. 324, 
the evidence showed that the injured employee was em-
ployed to render medical service with the understanding 
that he would live on the premises and respond to all 
emergency calls. That while playing tennis on the em-
ployer's premises he received an eye injury, and the 
Court held: 
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"That the exercise of his privilege to join in 
a game of tennis with other employees who were 
also indulging in the pleasure, did not result in 
service to the employer. He and his companions 
were free to use their time to suit themselves. It 
was while playing in this manner that the injured 
was struck in the eye with a tennis ball. At the 
time he was exercising a personal privilege apart 
from any interest of the employer, the nature of 
which cannot be considered as being for the bene-
fit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of 
both. His play was without direction or compul-
sion of any kind which required him to take part, 
and no duty was imposed on him nor would he be 
discharged for failure to participate." 
In the case of Tabor v. Midland Flour Milling Co., 
168 S.W. 2d, 458, the Court sets down the commonly ac-
cepted rule of "in course of employment" wherein the 
Court held: 
"An injury to an employee arises in course 
of employment when it occurs within the period 
of his employment at a place where he might 
reasonably he and while he is reasonably fulfill-
ing the duties of his employment or engaged in 
the performance of some task incidental thereto. 
But where, at the time of his injury, the employee 
is engaged in a voluntary act not known to or ac-
cepted by his employer and outside the duties for 
which he is employed, the injury is not received 
in the course of employment." 
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CONCLUSION 
That the Industrial Commision did not err in con-
cluding that the accident which caused the death of 
THO~L\S \YILLIA~l STROUD did not arise out of or 
in the course of his emploYJ.nent by Defendant SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION and in denying the claim 
of ~IARY ~I. STROUD for compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
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........................ copies of the foregoing brief received this 
........................ day of July, 1951. 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
